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Everybody but me.
-Langston Hughes
The Balkans start in the slums of Vienna. innovation. In developing countries in particular, the urban contribution to capital formation and urban participation in the labor force is expected to continue its steady rise (Grimmond 2007; World Bank 2008) .
As fi gure 1 shows, levels of urbanization are strongly related to long-run economic development-urbanization two decades ago is highly correlated with current per-capita income across countries. The trajectory of urban development and poverty will shape the fortunes of both middle-and lower-income nations for years to come.
The availability of human, fi nancial and physical resources in cities in these poorer countries, as well as the policies that allocate and mobilize these resources in urban areas, are vital elements in combating pov- In this survey I focus largely (though not exclusively)
on the political agency of the urban poor, or the capacity of the poor to select, reward and sanction the leaders, institutions, policies, formal rules and informal norms that directly affect their lives. The concept is suffi ciently broad to cover a range of political interactions in which the urban poor-or indeed, urban citizens more generally-fi nd themselves enmeshed, from dealings with police, landlords, employers, bureaucrats and middlemen, to relationships with political or community organizations and law-making bodies. At the same time, the notion of "agency" also highlights a specifi c channel by which the poor obtain (or fail to obtain) the policies, goods and services that benefi t them, namely, access and representation in governance.
I argue that a suitable agenda for future research can be found in better understanding (i) the sources and determinants of political agency among the urban poor (as well as of the differences between the degree of political agency of those below the poverty line and those above it in urban areas); and (ii) the consequences of the absence of stable, reliable political agency for urban development and poverty.
I fi rst examine briefl y the role of agency in some major approaches to urban-poverty analyses in developed nations, before examining some implications for the political-economy of urban poverty. I then explore some of the "pathologies" or urban poverty and their connections to agency problems, as well as the consequences for the urban poor. I conclude by examining several research directions that could shed light on some of the main puzzles regarding the politics of urban poverty. 
Understanding the lack of agency among the urban poor
Why has the development of effective political agency for the poor proven so difficult? Questions of participation and collective action have been enormously important for the urban poor in industrialized nations, given the prolonged periods of agitation for political reforms beginning in the cities in these countries. Due in no small part to urban labor unrest, the watershed period for political enfranchisement was the late 19 th century when the franchise was extended to the working poor in the United States and in Western Europe.
In America, the Fourteenth Amendment, which guaranteed to all the privileges and immunities of citizens, was adopted in 1868; in Britain, the Reform Act of 1867 gave working men, including a sizable proportion of unskilled laborers, the preponderance of the vote; in France, the Organic Law of 1875 instituted manhood suffrage. Similar events occurred in other Western European countries.
But these efforts-and the expectations that the spread of the franchise to a larger, more heterogeneous citizenry would force changes on governments and their relationships to the poor-were followed by a series of disillusionments as ruling oligarchies continued to assert themselves, and as inequities persisted.
I examine four perspectives on this problem in richer nations, before addressing some implications for developing countries.
The resource-mobilization theories
Social movements were traditionally seen as extensions of more elementary forms of collective behavior and as encompassing both movements of personal change (e.g. religious sects, cults, and communes) and those focused on institutional changes (e.g. legal reforms and changes in political power).
In explaining why the urban poor, for example, joined social movements aimed at agitating for urban reform, traditional explanation ("mass society" or collective-behavior approaches) pointed to sudden increases in individual grievances generated by the "structural strains" of rapid social change. These traditional theories shared the assumptions that movement participation was relatively rare, discontent was transitory, movement and institutionalized actions were sharply distinct, and movement actors were "arational" if not irrational. The urban movements of the 1960s dramatically challenged these assumptions.
By providing a rich array of experience and enlisting the active sympathies of an enlarged pool of analysts, the movements stimulated a shift in theoretical assumptions and analytic emphases that eventually became formalized in the resource mobilization theory of social movements (Tilly 1978; Zald and McCarthy 1988) .
In its most basic form, the resource-mobilization thesis argues that social movement actions are (i) rational, adaptive responses to the costs and rewards of different lines of action; (ii) the basic goals of movements are defi ned by confl icts of interest built into institutionalized power relations; and (iii) the grievances generated by such confl icts are suffi ciently ubiquitous that the formation and mobilization of movements depend on changes in resources, group organization and opportunities for collective action. 
The culture-of-poverty theories
A second perspective examines the social settings in which the urban poor live, and the effects of these networks on the incentives and behaviors of the urban poor. Here one fi nds two inter-related strands.
The "Culture-of-Poverty" thesis originally supported the idea of a distinctive, self-perpetuating culture of poverty that deals with authority in certain ways, that promotes certain forms of self-destructive (even criminal) behavior, and that largely is self-excluded from civic life (for example, in the writings of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, and Oscar Lewis). A different strand articulates the view that authority patterns among the urban poor is an "adaptive" response to the defi ning trait of urban poverty: being compelled to live with and manage high scarcity in a populous, crowded setting:
Though societies no doubt have cultures that cut across class lines, we may also posit that objective conditions of life shared by social strata will underlie subcultural differences, as determinants or constraints. For the lower, less advantaged strata, the most obviously shared objective condition is great scarcity. Thus, it seems reasonable to posit that there will exist everywhere essentially similar authority-cultures of poverty-a core of common attitudes toward processes of governance and relations of authority associated with low incomes, little instruction, and menial work (Eckstein 1984) .
These culture-of-poverty views have been infl uenced by political sociology and focus on the mechanisms by which individuals are socialized in urban settingsthrough the family, schools, and urban civic society.
The latter category encompasses organizations ranging from religious groups to mafi as and street gangs and other informal groupings. The main explanation for the absence of effective agency is one of self exclusion, but self-exclusion as a coping mechanism given the barriers to inclusion present in the authority-culture of the urban poor. There is an assumption, throughout these analyses, that the authority exercised in urban-poor life is unlikely to breed participatory dispositions in family members, nor are family relations among the poor likely to produce the sense that one can be effective in infl uencing policies and governing institutions. refrain from acting in a treacherous manner, and they will therefore believe that "most people can be trusted." Here that it is not just the effi ciency alone with which treacherous behavior is punished, but the effi ciency paired with the fairness of these institutions that matters for generalized trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2002) .
Social capital theories
In other words, if citizens can trust the institutional effectiveness and fairness of higher-order institutions such as the judicial system and the police, then one's generalized trust in others can be facilitated.
From this perspective, the fault for the lack of agency among the urban poor rests squarely on the poorlyperforming, often predatory institutions of law and order-police brutality, corruptible bureaucrats, etc.-which undermines social capital. Note that, in contrast to more society-centric views, these institutional views imply that social capital can be augmented via urban governance reforms.
Voting theories
Agency-based voting models study the choices of politicians facing the threat of re-election (where the politician is "agent" and voters are "principals"). In other words, political-agency models deal with a critical process in democracy, i.e., the appointment of public leaders through elections, and the extent to which elections can resolve confl icts of interest between citizens and their representatives. But agency is similarly relevant in non-democratic settings, as the tenure of non-elected leaders is ultimately a function on a tacit compliance of the governed.
In formal voting models, voters' preferences do not translate into electoral outcomes for a number of reasons. First, there is the standard rational-voter problem, where citizens do not see any individual reward to voting given the costs involved (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) . In American cities, of course, this problem was partially solved by the presence of urban political machines that distributed public services and jobs in exchange for votes.
Second, there is the informational constraint, which can be severe to lower-income voters. Extrapolating from fi rst generation agency models the assumption is that the urban poor view all politicians as identical and employ a "cut-off" rule, that is, they support leaders if their performance exceeds a threshold and do not support then otherwise (e.g., Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986 ). Alternatively, they may vote for incumbents if and only if they believe they are better candidates than the challenger, and politicians separate according to type, with better politicians taking superior actions (e.g., Banks and Sundaram 1998 , Coate and Morris 1995 , Fearon 1999 , and Rogoff 1990 ). The problem is that neither the "performance" of politicians nor their "type" is fully public information. Thus poorer, uninformed voters rely on signaling mechanisms that politicians use to garner support-appeals to sentiments, symbolism, and other appeals to the biases in the electorate (Caplan 2007) . 
Implications for urban politics in lowincome countries
According to standard median-voter models, for example, redistribution should be increasing with a rising income gap between the median and the mean voter. If the median voter is a poor, urban resident, redistributive taxation should run from rich to poor, from rural to urban areas. The evidence for this correlation-between rich/poor or urban/rural inequality and redistribution-in developing countries is thin.
While some authors fi nd a connection (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Milanovic 2002 ), others do not (Perotti 1996; Kenworthy and McCall 2007) . This has led some to believe that a robust empirical relationship does not exist, or that redistribution runs from the ends of the income distribution toward the middle class (Stigler 1970; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Epple and Romano 1996) . 
POLITICAL PATHOLOGIES OF URBAN POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES F
or the urban poor there is the general problem of effective disenfranchisement despite the fact than in many developing nations the voting turnout of the urban poor is actually higher than that of the middle classes and the rich. As I explore further below, the urban poor in developing countries-with few exceptions-vote in order to secure public goods and services that they otherwise lack, rather than to express policy preferences. In addition, very little political action beyond voting is undertaken by the urban poor. In non-democratic settings, moreover, the disenfranchisement of the urban poor is often more extreme, as the urban poor (as opposed to the urban middle classes or the rural poor) rarely matter in the calculations of even the most "populist" authoritarian regimes.
From this disenfranchisement stems a host of political-economic obstacles to poverty reduction in cities.
I summarize from some of the pathologies attendant with this disenfranchisement that may be gleaned from political-economic analyses of poverty in developing nations.
Collective action and social movements
One of the peculiarities of urban political life is the relative absence of protest given the appalling conditions in which so many people live (Gilbert 1994) . Exclusion (via discrimination) and self-exclusion of potential social program benefi ciaries (Platteau 2000; Castro-Leal et al. 1999 ).
In addition to ethno-linguistic cleavages, it is possible that labor market dualism-where it is strong-also undermines the capacity of the urban poor to coordinate. Rural-to-urban migration has established a sizeable group of migrant workers in cities, whose residence may be short term and whose links to fi rms in urban areas may be fl eeting. Intense labor-market competition in urban areas, moreover, further weakens incentives urban residents from similar socioeconomic strata to coordinate action. 
Participation and representation
In the cities of developing countries, large segments of the population experience chronic poverty with 
Political machines
The third idea that runs through the literature of urban politics is that the organizations of the poor that do exist, far from being organs of civic education and advancing public interests, are in effect little more than "gangs"-that is, mechanisms for exploitation, As indicated above, many poorer urban residents work in the informal sector without legal protections. Formal market regulations, on the books, are more extensive on average in developing countries than in OECD countries (Botero et al. 2004 ). The de facto reach of these regulations is limited, however, because they do not cover the large informal sector-and compliance in the formal sector is uneven at best (Berg 2006) .
Note that in the case of OECD economies, although union density has been declining for decades, the "coverage" of unions-i.e., the percentage of workers who work under collectively-bargained agreementsremains high. In developing countries, where unions forgo collective bargaining for other activities, the wage effects tend to be non-existent.
Legal exclusion
In addition to the familiar "gaps" between rich and poor in developing countries-in terms of income, vulnerability, access to public services, asset ownership, land quality, etc.-the ability to access and use legal institutions is also distributed unevenly in most societies. In developing countries, the urban poor in particular have little access and are infrequent users of the legal system. They often live in various forms of illegality-in housing or in work, in the use of electricity-and encounter the legal system primarily in criminal prosecutions (Anderson 2003) .
Informality in employment has been discussed above.
The urban poor also run informal businesses-without formal loans or contracts that are enforceable beyond a small range of acquaintances. These urban-poor entrepreneurs can rarely obtain tax breaks and other business incentives that may be awarded other entrepreneurs. They must work around urban zoning regulations that prevent them from trading. They are often denied the right to use common and public resources.
And they may be constrained by burdensome public 
Urban social protection
One related effect of the clientelist mode of participation is that the urban working class does not have a Supporters have argued that decentralization is better suited to antipoverty programs for two reasons.
First, better information is available at the regional or local level than to the center. Second, local institutions, being closer to program benefi ciaries, are more accountable to citizens. Field research on communitydriven projects has shown that there does tend to be an informational advantage, but that the informational resource of locals is not always put to best use.
Researchers have found that local community agents have better information on household characteristics and can therefore assess benefi ciary eligibility better than outsiders who rely on cruder proxies (Cremer, Estache, and Seabright 1996) . Among urban communities in Albania, for example, those using local information that was unlikely to be obtained on the In the words of one study, scaled up antipoverty projects-without fundamental changes to authority relations within affected communities-often constitute "nothing other than new 'structures' with which
[elites] can seek to establish an instrumentally profi table position within the existing structure of neo-patrimonialism" (Chabal and Daloz 1999, pp. 24-25) .
Membership organizations for the urban poor
A second topic for inquiry is of the role of "membership organizations"-self-governed organizations aimed at a advancing a mutual cause of members-for the urban poor. As is often reported, there is sometimes a contentious relationship between the urban poor and outsider-run NGOs that serve these communities. In the 'Cruz and Satterthwaite (2006) Dhaka study referenced above, responses of surveyed slum-dwellers to NGOs were uniformly negative. A survey of citizens in 10 cities in Africa, Latin America, and Asia fi nds that urban NGOs often have "tense relationships with community leaders and little capacity to organize the support the poorest citizens (Devas 2004) .
A study of membership organizations in urban areas in developing countries fi nds that they generally focus on efforts to:
[U]pgrade slums and squatter settlements, to develop new housing that low-income urban households can afford, and to improve provision 
